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A B S T R A C T
Port choice decisions are often considered to be based on unambiguous choice criteria. The authors examine how
port users' evaluation of these criteria can differ and how this may affect actors' incentive structure and decision
making, and ultimately port performance. Apart from ports' physical characteristics, the paper considers port
policy and freight market conditions as components of actors' incentive structures. As port users interact, each
actor's decision making has consequences for the incentives offered to others – with an important role for
strategic behavior. The aggregate of port users' decisions affects a port's throughput, cargo composition, and
value added, and has implications for handling efficiency. This paper combines these insights within an over-
arching framework linking port characteristics, policy, and freight market conditions to port user choice be-
havior and the consequences for ports.
The paper explores various facets of this framework using the case of how the Port of Rotterdam competes
along the Hamburg–Le Havre range, drawing on port throughput data on various levels of detail and in-depth
interviews with a representative selection of port stakeholders. It shows that there is a downside to ports being
particularly attractive to carriers, in that the port that offers the most incentives to carriers disproportionately
attracts relatively low-value activities: inefficient calls and a large share of empty containers, along with a strong
import/export imbalance. Interview findings contextualize the findings from the data and elaborate further on
the mechanisms underpinning these observations. Most importantly, the attractiveness of a port for carriers does
not always translate into attractiveness for shippers. The challenge for port policy is to balance the port's po-
sitioning toward its different categories of users and achieve a congruent value proposition for all port users.
1. Introduction
Port competitiveness is generally conceptualized as driven by
straightforward and unambiguous criteria, such as port costs, handling
efficiency, geographical location, hinterland connectivity, and the
quality of infrastructure and services, that draw port users and cargo to
the port (Martínez Moya and Feo Valero, 2017). The more efficient and
cost-effective a port's operations, the better its competitive position
relative to other ports that could theoretically serve the same customers
(Parola et al., 2017). From this perspective, characteristics inherent to
the port directly link port performance and port competitiveness. A
port's performance on criteria that are important to port users steers
port users in their decision to prefer one port over another and hence
influences a port's competitive position relative to other ports. This
article proposes a more diverse perspective on port performance and
port choice, focusing on the roles of preference heterogeneity among
port users, strategic behavior, stakeholder interactions, and contextual
factors such as freight market conditions in explaining port choice and
port competitiveness. This entails a more ambiguous conceptualization
of port performance, including the idea that port choice incentives may
have divergent effects on different port users and indirectly affect a
port's performance in terms of cargo composition, value added, and
handling efficiency.
Port performance is conceptualized as the efficiency with which
companies operating in the port and port authorities are able to fulfill
or facilitate and align port processes in various transport chains (Borges
Vieira, Kliemann Neto and Goncalves Amaral, 2014). This paper focuses
on seaborne transportation of containers, where port competition tends
to be particularly fierce. Port competitiveness extends from perfor-
mance and is conceptualized as a port's “capacity to provide a unique
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value proposition under better conditions than competitors” (Parola
et al., 2017: 116). A port competes with other ports that could theo-
retically serve the same supply chains (defined as broadly as possible, as
shippers' container supply chains from the exporter's point of con-
solidation to the importer's location) and/or hinterland (Verhoeven,
1981; Haezendonck, 2001; Robinson, 2002). Earlier studies have dis-
cussed inter-port competition (Slack, 1985; Song, 2002; Meersman
et al., 2010) and decision-making processes of the major categories of
port actors: port authorities, terminals, shippers, and carriers (or ship-
ping lines) (Heaver et al., 2001; Wiegmans et al., 2008; Talley and Ng,
2013; Martínez Moya and Feo Valero, 2017), with third party logistics
providers sometimes acting as shippers' agents (Magala and Sammons,
2008; Jayaram and Tan, 2010). Other studies have provided a broader
conceptualization of individual actors' choice behavior and port com-
petitiveness (De Martino and Morvillo, 2008; Button et al., 2015).
However, heterogeneity in supply chain actors' preferences and stra-
tegic behavior – and their implications – from a multi-stakeholder
perspective have received relatively little attention, even though re-
cognizing these elements provides a more comprehensive perspective
on port competition and performance.
In the literature, the criteria that underpin carriers' and shippers'
port choices overlap considerably (Martínez Moya and Feo Valero,
2017) and are also considered to be drivers of port competitiveness
(Parola et al., 2017), but the role of possible divergence in preferences
is generally overlooked. Also, strategic behavior and possible inad-
vertent effects resulting from port choice incentives (policy driven,
physical, or a combination of the two) have received little attention.
How do different actors value port choice incentives, and what are the
implications for a port's competitive position?
This question is addressed by first outlining the present knowledge
on port choice behavior in container transport (section 2) and com-
bining these in a comprehensive framework (section 3). Subsequently,
the paper highlights some potentially interesting interrelations that
have not been addressed in the literature so far. These facets of the
framework are explored further by considering the case of how the Port
of Rotterdam competes with other major Western European seaports
along the Hamburg–Le Havre (HLH) range. The case study draws on
publicly available data on port throughput and a series of interviews
conducted with a representative selection of port actors. By triangu-
lating various sources of evidence (see section 4), the paper presents an
in-depth look into how port choice incentives relate to port choice
behavior and port performance and competitiveness (section 5). Section
6 discusses implications of the findings and concludes.
2. Background – decision making in deep-sea container chains
A container port's market share (in terms of throughput – one of the
most common port performance indicators) relative to nearby compe-
titors depends on the aggregated decisions of actors in the logistics
chains that could run through the port. In deep-sea container shipping,
four major categories of stakeholders are involved: port authorities,
container terminals, container shipping lines (carriers), and cargo
owners (shippers or their agents). This overview focuses on the deep-
sea part of the supply chain – hence omitting choice behavior regarding
hinterland transport and short-sea shipping. The literature so far has
focused on these actors' individual strategies and some interactions
between two – or mostly three – actors. This study unifies these insights
into one overarching framework, considering port choice incentives in
the form of port policy, physical port characteristics, and freight market
conditions, and their effects on different stakeholders with different
preferences and strategies. Moreover, we consider several interrelations
within this framework. Sub-sections 2.1–2.4 discuss insights into supply
chain actors' decision making, after which section 3 presents the in-
tegrative framework connecting these.
2.1. The shipper
The initiator of a container supply chain is the shipper, who needs to
have goods transported from one location to another and contracts
service providers to organize this. A review of port choice research
(Martínez Moya and Feo Valero, 2017) classifies shippers’ port choice
criteria into three categories: location, effectiveness, and connectivity.
A port has to be suitably located relative to the origin or destination of
the cargo. Of the ports that satisfy this criterion, the port that handles
the cargo most efficiently (mainly in terms of costs, transit time, and
reliability) and has the best connections with other ports and the hin-
terland will be preferred by shippers.
However, there are trade-offs that shippers consider on an in-
dividual basis, depending on their preferences. Overall, shippers aim to
minimize the total logistics costs of their transport chain – monetary
and otherwise (Nir et al., 2003; Talley and Ng, 2013). Faster transit
often comes at a premium price, and the time that goods are in transit
also imposes costs on the shipper for insurance, depreciation, restricted
cash flow, and perhaps the time-sensitive nature of the cargo. More-
over, the level of service may differ between ports and logistics service
providers. Depending on their preferences, shippers choose supply
chain partners and ports that best suit their time, service, and cost
preferences.
This is not always the shipper's decision. The party that makes the
port choice is determined in the freight contract, usually along
International Commercial Terms (Incoterms) rules. Here, the key dis-
tinction is between carrier haulage and merchant haulage. Under car-
rier haulage, the shipper chooses a container carrier, who is then re-
sponsible for the complete transport of a container (often by enlisting
subcontractors for the hinterland transport) and can hence decide on
the route used to transport the container, including port choice. Under
merchant haulage, the shipper or consignee is responsible for arranging
the land transportation and hence determines port choice. Secondly,
shippers – particularly smaller companies with limited supply chain
capabilities – often contract a specialized party for this. These third-
party logistics providers (3 PL) specialize in consolidating and orches-
trating supply chains, and in doing so take over decision making, such
as carrier and port choice from shippers (Magala and Sammons, 2008;
Jayaram and Tan, 2010). Third, a relatively new development is
terminal haulage, where the terminal arranges transport to and from
the hinterland (e.g. the extended gate concept (Veenstra et al., 2012)).
2.2. The carrier
The shipping line carries the container over sea and is usually the
owner of the shipping container. Liners sail on regular routes and
schedules between multiple ports and take cargo at publicly listed rates
(Stopford, 2009). Shippers (or their agents) lease containers from deep-
sea carriers and rent capacity on container ships. Depending on the
demand for transportation and port selection criteria, shipping lines
adjust their planning to minimize costs and maximize volume and
profits (Andersen, 2010; Meng et al., 2014).
Indirectly, shippers' port selection criteria determine carrier port
selection through their effect on port-specific demand, both import and
export – particularly when the goods are transported under merchant
haulage. This works the other way as well, given that shippers prefer
ports that are well-connected by carriers' networks. Furthermore,
shipping lines have their own considerations that underpin their plan-
ning at the strategic, tactical, and operational level (Mulder and
Dekker, 2017), including port selection criteria. Many of these relate to
location (accessibility and berth availability), effectiveness (terminal
efficiency, infrastructure quality), connectivity (deep-sea, short-sea,
and hinterland connections) (Wiegmans et al., 2008; Martínez Moya
and Feo Valero, 2017), and other factors including the planning of al-
liance partners (Panayides and Wiedmer, 2011), operational con-
siderations such as repositioning empty containers, and subjective
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preferences (Button et al., 2015). If they have a choice between mul-
tiple terminals in a port, as is the case in most major ports, carriers also
select a terminal (Wiegmans et al., 2008). This decision is chiefly driven
by terminal performance criteria such as cost, capacity, accessibility,
handling speed, reliability, and connectivity. Moreover, there is a role
for more tacit factors such as the ease of doing business (Hupkens,
2017) and strategic factors such as carriers’ long-term agreements with
terminals, investments in terminals, and the terminal arrangements of
alliance partners (see section 2.3). When a carrier has a position in (or a
good agreement with) a terminal, this may tip the decision between two
ports.
2.3. The terminal operator
Terminal operators handle containers at the interface between
maritime and land transport, using dedicated equipment to load and
unload containers from container vessels and transfer them to and from
hinterland transport modalities (Lun and Cariou, 2009).
There are two distinct business models in the container handling
industry. First, a company may see opportunities to profit from steve-
doring activities as its core business and operate independent terminals.
This is the business model of horizontally integrated global terminal
operators (Slack and Frémont, 2016): these companies operate multi-
user terminals that provide services to multiple shipping lines. Sec-
ondly, a shipping line may integrate vertically and operate its own
terminals to cut costs and ensure capacity. Hybrid forms also exist, with
terminals being joint ventures between one or multiple shipping lines
and a specialized Terminal Operating Company.
Carriers not committed to a terminal in a certain port negotiate
long-term agreements with multi-user terminals to reserve capacity:
Terminals commit the carrier to a minimum guaranteed volume and
in exchange the carrier is usually provided with guaranteed time
slots for vessel berthing and numbers of containers handled per
hour. In virtually all cases, the terms of the contract are based on
container moves, irrespective of size or type. There is usually a price
differentiation between full and empty containers as well as a spe-
cial allowance for transshipment boxes. (European Commission,
2009).
Particularly, empty containers and transshipment containers are less
profitable for the terminal operator, regardless of the operational costs
incurred in handling these containers.
Shipping lines define the terminal handling charge (THC) as “based
on the cost of handling the container in the terminals, including loading
and discharging containers to/from the vessel” (Maersk Line, 2017) – a
port-specific flat-fee surcharge to the shipper. However, carriers'
terminal costs are the outcome of negotiations between carriers and
terminals, reflecting not only handling costs, but also the relative bar-
gaining positions of carriers and terminals. Because these market con-
ditions play a role in the process in which THCs are established, ship-
pers are charged a container handling fee that is not necessarily
representative of a port's true handling efficiency.
2.4. The port authority
Port authority policy aims to balance demands from the three main
functional roles of the port: transportation node, industrial cluster, and
logistics cluster (Nijdam and Van der Horst, 2017). For each function,
the focus is on a different user: for the port as a transportation node, the
most important users are shipping lines, but, for the port as a logistics
cluster, the shipper (or 3PL) is the most important user. Naturally, the
criteria are different for the different roles. For shipping lines, nautical
accessibility and servicing efficiency are important, whereas for ship-
pers, hinterland connectivity also is particularly important. However, as
discussed, a port also attracts shipping lines through their attraction of
shippers and their cargo.
Nowadays, European port authorities generally take a landlord role,
in that they grant land concessions to terminal operators in exchange
for a concession fee and additional stipulations that ensure that the
broader societal goals of the port authority are also met (Notteboom
and Verhoeven, 2010; Theys et al., 2010). Although a port authority
aims to have terminals within the port that function as well as possible
to make the port attractive for carriers and shippers, the port authority's
key performance indicator is not exactly the same as for the container
terminals it facilitates: whereas (multi-user) terminals strive to max-
imize efficiency and profits, port authorities tend to aim at maximizing
throughput and revenue (Talley and Ng, 2013).
Apart from concession fee revenues, port authorities charge port
dues to vessels calling at the port, usually based on gross tonnage, cargo
volume, or both. Port authorities can strategically adjust port dues to
attract as much cargo to their ports as possible. Many ports offer dis-
counts for transshipment cargo, second calls (i.e. a ship calling at the
port twice within a few days) and volume discounts that grow in-
crementally as the carrier loads and/or unloads more cargo.
A framework exploring the factors underpinning these actors’ de-
cision making, their interactions, and implications for ports is elabo-
rated in section 3.
3. Stakeholder choice criteria and interactions – an integrated
framework
Earlier work (Talley and Ng, 2013) noted that actors select their
partners strategically, based on the criteria that they value in their
supply chains. Hence, ports compete not just for cargo, but also to at-
tract certain supply chains (Robinson, 2002). Shippers and forwarders
seek to minimize their overall logistics costs and select their supply
chain partners accordingly. Port authorities and terminals – despite
being geographically bound – engage in the same selection behavior by
negotiating long-term contracts with shipping lines (as terminals do) or
long-term leases with terminals (as port authorities do). Moreover,
through their pricing strategies and service offering, they attract ship-
pers and carriers with certain preferences.
For a deeper understanding of container port competition, one
should consider heterogeneity in supply chain actors' preferences.
Moreover, these heterogeneous decision-making processes should be
considered in relation to one another. Earlier work has highlighted
interdependencies and interaction effects between supply chain actors'
decision-making processes (Heaver et al., 2001; Talley and Ng, 2013;
Van der Lugt, Rodrigues and Van den Berg, 2014), but a completely
integrated perspective with the four key stakeholder categories, port
competition, and heterogeneity in port users’ preferences and require-
ments has been lacking. Based on the survey of choice behavior lit-
erature above, augmented with theories on competition and competi-
tive strategies, this section presents a conceptual framework integrating
these elements (Fig. 1).
The model contextualizes choice behavior (see Table 1). The supply
chain choices of shippers and carriers (the most footloose port users)
are considered in the broader context of a local freight market (demand
for and supply of container transportation capacity, including import,
export, and transshipment) and factors relating to port characteristics
and policy. For the sake of parsimony, the broader context of more
structural factors such as the state of the world and local economy,
developments in world trade, and technology developments are con-
sidered exogenous. In aggregate, actors’ contextually bound choices
result in a freight market equilibrium and the respective cargo mixes
and market shares of ports (i.e. their competitive position relative to
other ports that compete for the same hinterland).
Market developments also influence power relations between ac-
tors, influencing the outcomes of their interactions (Parola and Musso,
2007). First, as terminals invest in capacity based on concession
agreements lasting 20–30 years, supply of handling capacity is inelastic
in the short and medium term once the terminal is constructed.
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However, demand for transportation and hence handling capacity can
fluctuate strongly in a short timeframe. When demand for container
transport is high and terminals are operating at full capacity, supplier
power of terminal operators relative to carriers is high. However, when
demand declines and there is excess capacity at terminals, supplier
power of terminals diminishes. Secondly, as the liner industry con-
solidates and operates in closer alliances, its bargaining power vis-à-vis
terminals and shippers increases (all else being equal). This can impact
negatively on the performance of container terminals. For example,
carriers can demand more flexibility from terminal operators, such as
extended berth time or more complex handling moves at lower charges
(undercutting handling efficiency), or push to renegotiate rates alto-
gether (undercutting profitability).
Port-specific characteristics and incentives from port authority
policy (of which the relevant aspects are listed in the boxes on the left
side) directly influence the decision-making of shippers (consisting of
forwarder, carrier, and port choice) and carriers (consisting of planning
at the strategic, tactical, and operational level), as shown by unidirec-
tional arrows. The freight market context not only influences shipper
and carrier behavior, but is made up of the aggregate of their choices
(hence the two-headed arrow). Port performance (in terms of market
share, throughput volume and value, terminal performance, and
throughput composition) is influenced by carrier and shipper choices,
but is also a choice criterion for both, hence the two-directional arrows
on the right side.
Discussing implications for port competition and competitiveness,
we focus further on the role of port policy. Port authorities can stra-
tegically position themselves in certain transport chains to attract
specific types of users. When ports in a region compete to serve the
same contested hinterland, they position themselves strategically with a
competitive aim. This is done through marketing policies and the in-
centives offered to port users. Assuming for simplicity that this posi-
tioning works along the two main choice criteria for shippers and
carriers, namely, cost and service quality (broadly conceived), this
positioning can be best understood using Porter's generic strategies
framework (Porter, 1980). Porter describes how a company – or port –
can build a competitive advantage in two ways: either by having a
unique advantage in the perception of customers, or by having the
lowest cost in the industry. These two strategies aim at different market
segments, namely, customers that value differentiated products or ser-
vices versus customers for whom cost is the most important criterion.
When an organization fails to be the overall cost leader, but does not
deliver differentiated service to customers that value this, it becomes
‘stuck in the middle’, where neither the cost-sensitive customers nor the
discerning high-value-oriented customers are attracted. The customers
that it does attract are more footloose and are easily whisked away by
organizations with low costs or a more differentiated service offer. This
can be as much a matter of bad luck as the mistake of not aiming for a
clearly defined strategy.
The relevance for port policy is clear if one considers trade-offs
between the two major choice criteria: port service quality and costs. A
low-cost port attracts supply chains that value low costs more than
anything else – probably lower-value cargo that does not require spe-
cific servicing and does not generate much value added for the port. On
the other hand, ports with a higher level of service quality attract the
supply chains of more discerning shippers with cargo that requires
more efficient handling, is perhaps more time-sensitive, or in any other
way justifies higher costs for better service. This is likely to be higher-
value cargo, which provides more opportunities for value added ser-
vices in or related to the port cluster. Also, even if competing ports in a
region all have a cost reduction focus, investments are still necessary to
ensure efficiency and long-run competitiveness (Cheon et al., 2018).
Ports will likely not strike the exact same balance between cost re-
duction and efficiency investment, resulting in differences between
ports that can incentivize port user behavior analogous to price dif-
ferentiation.
Fig. 1. Conceptual framework on port choice criteria, port user choice behavior, and implications for ports.
Source: See the literature overview in Table 1.
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Moreover, considering the different functions of ports, and port
users and their criteria, the incentive structure does not necessarily
have to be the same for all users: a port that is cheapest for carriers may
not be the cheapest for shippers, and the port with the best service offer
for shippers may not be the best at servicing carriers.
Section 4 discusses how the interrelations inferred from the litera-
ture and presented in the model will be explored.
4. Methodology
Guided by existing theory on port choice behavior, section 3 out-
lined some plausible interdependencies referred to in passing in the
literature, but not yet addressed in depth. To provide an in-depth il-
lustration of the working of the interactions outlined in the framework,
this study examines how the Port of Rotterdam competes with the other
major container ports along the HLH range. The case study draws on
publicly accessible information on the ports involved and their com-
petitive positions. Secondly, industry stakeholders were interviewed. It
should be noted that the nature of the data does not allow findings to be
proven with statistical significance. Rather, the study “relies on mul-
tiple sources of evidence with data needing to converge in a triangular
fashion” (Yin, 1994, p. 13) to achieve a rich, well-rounded narrative
addressing the ‘how’ question of the proposed interdependencies be-
tween context, behavior, and port performance. Interviewing re-
spondents from various types of stakeholder organizations is likely to
yield contradictory perspectives on the relations of interest. However,
by treating respondents as individual cases of stakeholder positions, the
study aims for replication of findings following either a literal replica-
tion logic (cases with similar findings to be expected, i.e. representative
of similar organizations) or a theoretical replication logic (cases with
contrasting results, but for predictable reasons, i.e. representative of
different types of organizations) (Yin, 1994). Combining these ap-
proaches, the case study helps to formulate a well-rounded, coherent
narrative of how the relations outlined in section 3 work, which may
serve as a template for theory for future work.
From October 2016 to February 2017, three representatives from
the container terminal industry, three representatives of the Port of
Rotterdam authority, two representatives of two major (top 10) con-
tainer shipping firms, and three representatives of two major global
freight forwarders were interviewed. Forwarders (as 3 PLs) were ap-
proached to elicit the shipper perspective on port choice. Many shippers
are relatively small firms, making up a miniscule share of all container
movements, whereas the forwarders interviewed arrange the transport
of millions of containers per year for their clients. The interviewees
were selected on the criterion that they should be directly involved in
their firm's decision making, resulting in respondents in management
positions in commercial or strategic departments. Each interview lasted
between one and two hours and was conducted in a semi-structured
format, with five guiding questions based on the relationships of in-
terest discussed in section 3. This semi-structured format left room for
respondents to raise relevant issues themselves, while also inviting
them to share their perspectives on our conjectures. The following
guiding questions were used:
1. How do you evaluate the competitive position of the Port of Rotterdam
as a container port relative to nearby competitors, and what are the most
important developments and their drivers?
2. How attractive is the Port of Rotterdam to carriers and shippers, and
how do you see the positioning of the Port Authority and the container
terminals in this market? How does this positioning/strategy compare to
other ports in the region?
3. What factors are – from your perspective – most important for the
competitive position of a container port?
4. Considering some aspects of Rotterdam's current competitive perfor-
mance (import/export imbalance, large share of empty containers,
relatively smaller call sizes), from your perspective, what are port users'
considerations that could drive these trends?
5. How would you describe the relations between carriers, shippers, and
terminals, and how does this relate to their chain partner choice beha-
vior, in particular port choice?
Some respondents preferred to make statements in a personal ca-
pacity, rather than as a formal representative of their company, and
therefore asked for the interviews not to be recorded. Notes were taken
during the interviews and later transcribed into interview reports –
rather than verbatim transcripts. Hence, the statements discussed are
paraphrased rather than quoted literally. Vogt et al.'s (2014: 55)
handbook on research methods suggests that for the purpose of our
investigation (asking “informational questions about matters of fact and
interviewees’ interpretations”) interview notes suffice. Furthermore, to
mitigate potential inaccuracies, a draft of this paper was presented to
the respondents to verify whether their viewpoints were represented
accurately, and whether they identified factual inaccuracies in the data
or the information gathered from other interviews – of course differ-
ences in perspective between stakeholders aside. This validation round
did not yield major discrepancies, suggesting that the various in-
formation sources helped highlight complementary aspects of the same
phenomenon.
5. Case outline and findings
The relations outlined in section 3 are explored further using the
case of how the Port Rotterdam competes with other ports along the
HLH range.
5.1. World trade and container shipping
Since the crisis of 2008, the world economy has gradually re-
covered, but trade recovery was sluggish (OECD, 2015; IMF, 2016).
This led to financial distress in the shipping sector, with excess supply
and a downward pressure on freight rates. The sector's capacity to cut
costs is limited in the short run, as liner companies still have to service
their fixed schedules, even if demand is low (Stopford, 2009). As re-
cently as 2016, the container shipping sector posted annual losses over
$5 billion and witnessed the bankruptcy of Hanjin Shipping, until then
one of the largest carriers (Drewry, 2016). Remaining firms have pu-
shed for consolidation to mitigate losses through scale and to improve
competitiveness by expanding their market share, evidenced by several
mergers and acquisitions (Wackett, 2017). Moreover, a rearrangement
of the alliances in the liner market has brought the number of alliances
down to three, with a number of (minor) carriers still operating in-
dependently.
This consolidation has consequences in the freight market, in that
consolidation increases the buyer power of liners vis-à-vis ports and
terminal operators and liners’ supplier power toward shippers.
5.2. Container port competition along the HLH range
The ports along the HLH range handle a major share of Europe's
import and export flows, and four of the world's 25 largest ports are
located on this relatively short coastline.
The ports are different in overall cargo composition, but all have in
common that container handling makes up an important part of their
throughput. Moreover, a large share of the containers are transported
under merchant haulage (on average 70% of container cargo)
(Notteboom, 2008), implying that shipper decision making on port
choice is highly relevant. Considering container throughput alone, the
Port of Rotterdam has the largest total throughput, followed by a
growing Antwerp, a recently declining Hamburg, and a somewhat
smaller Bremerhaven (Fig. 2).
The ports have different physical characteristics. The Port of
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Antwerp lies upstream along the Scheldt, posing constraints on the
port's accessibility: the newest container vessels of 20,000 TEU and over
cannot enter the port fully loaded because of depth restrictions. In the
Port of Rotterdam, the Tweede Maasvlakte has been created to expand
the port's container handling capacity. This new extension is easily
accessible from sea by ships of all sizes. The container terminals in
Rotterdam – particularly those at the newly constructed Tweede
Maasvlakte – are considered to be state-of-the-art (Langen, Berg and
Willeumier, 2012a). However, with the opening of the Tweede
Maasvlakte in 2013, more capacity became available than was de-
manded in that generally depressed freight market. In Bremerhaven,
the four deep-sea container terminals, all located on one stretch of
5 km-long quay, are easily accessible for deep-sea vessels. However, as
the current quay stretches to the city-state limit, further port expansion
is unlikely. Lastly, the Port of Hamburg lies along the Elbe, some 80 km
inland from the sea. Because of the draft restrictions imposed by the
Elbe, the port cannot accommodate the largest container vessels fully
loaded.
5.3. Pricing and throughput composition
Section 5.2 shows that the ports differ considerably on physical
indicators of port competitiveness, i.e. geographical location and ac-
cessibility. Whereas Rotterdam and Bremerhaven are easily accessible
for deep-sea ships, Antwerp and Hamburg cannot be accessed by the
largest container ships fully loaded because of draft restrictions.
In terms of the port choice framework distilled from the literature,
this section (5.3) surveys all relevant findings on port choice incentives
(port characteristics and policy) and port performance for the four
major HLH ports. Given that important performance indicators are the
result of the aggregate of shipper and carrier decision making, two
specific interrelations are explored further. First, section 5.4.1 draws on
interview findings to explore how port choice incentives impact upon
actor choice behavior and in turn on performance. Secondly, section
5.4.2 explores how freight market conditions and power relations im-
pact on decision makers’ incentives, choice behavior, and ultimately
port performance.
To shippers, a port is priced through the THCs (Terminal Handling
Cost) listed by carriers. These are the same in both directions: i.e. a
container shipped from Hamburg to anywhere in the world has the
same handling charge as a container shipped from anywhere to
Hamburg.
Antwerp tends to be the cheapest, the German ports are most ex-
pensive, and Rotterdam is in between (Table 2). These THCs charged to
shippers likely deviate from the costs incurred by the terminal and
carriers, and from the rates negotiated between carriers and terminals –
in the scenario where this is negotiated with an independent terminal,
rather than a dedicated terminal simply operating as a cost center for a
carrier. However, as these are the rates offered to shippers, they likely
have a real effect on port choice.
The cost structure of carriers is composed of several factors apart
from the handling rates negotiated with terminals, including port dues,
quay, buoy, and dolphin dues, mooring services, and tugs and pilotage.
An inventory made by the Port of Rotterdam Authority shows that, in
terms of total call costs, Rotterdam is the cheapest, followed by
Bremerhaven, Antwerp, and Hamburg, respectively (personal commu-
nication, 2017).
Another part of the pricing structure faced by carriers is the in-
centives that port authorities offer to attract port calls and volume. The
most common incentives are discounts for vessels calling twice on the
same leg of a route, discounts for transshipment containers, and volume
discounts. Table 3 shows that Rotterdam offers the most generous price
incentives – at least in a comparison based on those listed publicly on
port authorities’ websites and publicly available documents.
Considering the cargo composition beyond volume alone, we ex-
amine publicly available data on the direction and content (full or
empty) of container flows through the major HLH ports. Fig. 3 shows
the balance between incoming and outgoing container flows, and Fig. 4
the share of empty containers in total outgoing container flows.
This warrants two observations. First, in Rotterdam the balance
between incoming and outgoing containers has become more skewed
since 2009. In 2015, for every 10 containers coming in, a little over
eight – on average – were exported. To illustrate: 10 containers are
imported by firms in the European hinterland, but for all that is
Fig. 2. Annual throughput (TEU) for four largest ports on Hamburg–Le Havre range.
Source: (Eurostat, 2017a).
Table 2
Terminal handling charges of selected carriers (euros per container).
Source: Corporate websites (2017).
Rotterdam Antwerp Hamburg Bremerhaven
Maersk 210 180 237 237
MSC 205 190 220 220
Hamburg Sud 205 190 225 225
Average 206.7 186.6 227.3 227.3
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imported and processed, only eight containers of goods leave. Twenty
percent of containers ‘disappear,’ to reappear in the ports that serve the
same hinterland, but have a positive export/import balance, such as
Bremerhaven and Antwerp. In the long run, this may not be a good sign
for a port, as it indicates that it is relatively less attractive to exporting
shippers in its own hinterland.
A second observation relates to the share of empty containers.
Empty containers are transported through a port at the discretion of the
carrier, so a larger share of empty containers indicates that a port is
relatively more attractive for carriers to do their repositioning. These
are, however, less valuable cargo, relatively less profitable for container
terminals to handle – as discussed in relation to the fixing of the THCs
between terminals and carriers – and indicate that a port may be
transporting less value than throughput statistics alone may suggest.
Antwerp, Bremerhaven, and Hamburg have gradually reduced the share
of empty containers exported, but in Rotterdam one in every five
containers exported is empty. These trends suggest that, despite a stable
throughput, the competitive position of the Port of Rotterdam warrants
two critical remarks: A lot more cargo is imported than is exported
through the port, and a large number of the containers that go out are
empty.
Combining container throughput data with data on container vessel
calls results in Fig. 5.
As the average vessel size increases, one would expect the number
of containers loaded and unloaded per call (the call size) to increase as
well. This is visible for all ports (with the possible exception of
Bremerhaven), but Rotterdam has started lagging behind in terms of
call size relative to Antwerp and Hamburg – two ports in which one
would expect it to a lesser degree given their draft restrictions.
Assuming that the same liner vessels call on the major HLH ports,
container terminals in Rotterdam are handling relatively fewer con-
tainers per call on the same trades than the ports with which it was on
par some years ago. Given that container terminals incur costs for each
call (idle time of quayside resources while the ship is mooring or
leaving and any window of time that the ship may be arriving early or
late), this hurts the efficiency of the Rotterdam container terminals.
Last, in terms of port efficiency, on the World Bank ‘Quality of Port
Infrastructure’ indicator, the Netherlands scores 6.8, Belgium 6.3, and
Germany 5.6 (World Bank, 2016). Assuming that the largest ports are
highly representative of a country's overall port infrastructure quality,
these figures suffice as a rough proxy measure of the focal ports' in-
frastructure quality.
The data surveyed warrant several observations. First, the price
structure facing shippers does not necessarily correspond with the price
structure facing carriers: the cheapest port from the perspective of a
carrier (based on port costs) is not the cheapest from the perspective of
a shipper (based on port-specific THCs). Second, the cheapest and one
of the most accessible ports for carriers with the best infrastructure –
Rotterdam – does not attract the best business: relatively few containers
per vessel call, a sharp import/export imbalance, and a large share of
empty container movements.
5.4. Interview findings
This section draws on observations from the interviews conducted
to contextualize the observations made above.
5.4.1. Port choice incentives
The major HLH range ports compete to a large extent for the same
hinterland. Shippers and carriers make their port choice based on their
own preferences and the ports’ price/quality offer. Through the in-
centive mechanisms consisting of port characteristics and port policy,
ports attract clients with certain preferences and over time develop a
certain profile of certain types of users and activities.
Per port, different incentive structures for shippers and carriers, and
different stakeholders’ policies, can be distinguished. Antwerp offers
the lowest THCs, German THCs are relatively high, and Rotterdam is in
between but differentiates itself by offering greater incentives to
Table 3
Port dues discounts for four major ports.
Source: Corporate websites, most recent versions of tariff specifications (2017).
Port Second call discount (per call) Transshipment discount (per container) Quantity discount (per call, based on total annual volume of carrier)
Antwerp 50% n.a. n.a.
Rotterdam 75% €5.00 Up to 22%
Bremerhaven 50% n.a. n.a.
Hamburg 50% Up to €0.50 n.a.
Fig. 3. Balance between incoming and outgoing containers (in TEU).
Source: (Eurostat, 2017b).
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carriers than other ports do. However, the interviewees made some
remarks with regard to these numbers. One forwarder emphasized that
large German shippers have long-term agreements with carriers, with
lower THCs than those quoted publicly. A port authority representative
affirmed this and estimated that the difference in effective THCs be-
tween Rotterdam and the German ports has diminished. Unequivocally,
the interviewees agreed that Antwerp is the cost leader along the HLH
range. The terminals, equipment, and infrastructure are not state-of-
the-art, but costs are kept low for price-sensitive shippers. Carrier MSC
uses Antwerp as a home port, focusing on low costs and high volumes,
and various interviewees estimated that the throughput growth in
Antwerp resulted mainly from MSC cargo.
The Port of Rotterdam distinguishes itself by offering the most
generous port dues discounts, but this comes with some caveats. One
carrier representative acknowledged that the Port of Rotterdam was
more public about its discounts but mentioned that, in all ports, dis-
count deals are made regularly with carriers. Another carrier re-
presentative was particularly appreciative of the “aggressive” discounts
offered by the Port of Rotterdam relative to other ports. All inter-
viewees affirmed that, in terms of total call costs (port dues, including
discounts, pilotage, tugs, quay dues), Rotterdam is the cheapest of the
HLH ports for carriers – along with the geographical advantages of its
location, its efficient infrastructure, and terminals that work around the
clock. One forwarder noted that these cost advantages accrue primarily
to carriers: shippers are quoted the THCs as listed and make their port
choices accordingly.
Terminal representatives noted that terminals’ cargo profiles differ
considerably. Apparently, Rotterdam attracts a disproportionate share
of empty containers, transshipment cargo, and repositioning requests
from carriers. This is ascribed to a combination of factors, namely, the
ease of access to Rotterdam, the handling efficiency of the terminals,
and the overall low costs of port calls. Carriers reposition empty con-
tainers at their own cost, so they prefer to move these through the port
with the lowest costs and the most efficient infrastructure. One carrier
representative affirmed that Rotterdam has always attracted a large
share of empty containers and transshipment cargo through its geo-
graphical position and relatively low costs for carriers.
Apart from cargo composition, ports’ shipper profiles differ. One
forwarder illustrated how Hamburg and Antwerp have relatively large
shares of carrier haulage, whereas Rotterdam has a larger share of
merchant haulage. Carriers earn more on carrier haulage, whereas
shippers using merchant haulage tend to have greater demands on
Fig. 4. Share of empty containers in outgoing container flows (TEU).
Source: (Eurostat, 2017b).
Fig. 5. Average throughput (1000 TEU) per vessel call per year 2005–2015.
Source: (Eurostat, 2017a).
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service quality and handling speed, as well as a cost focus. Hence, be-
tween ports, the client profile and demand factors differ considerably.
Total logistics costs – of which the THC is a component – are an
important criterion for shippers’ port choice. However, other pre-
ferences are also relevant. All carriers, terminal operators, and for-
warders noted that German clients tend to be somewhat “chauvinistic”
in their choices and prefer doing business with someone who speaks
their language (literally and figuratively) and therefore are oriented
predominantly toward German partners and German ports. Carrier and
terminal representatives stated that port authorities do not recognize
this dimension of port choice enough. This cultural component is also
visible in Antwerp and Rotterdam, according to forwarder re-
presentatives. Clients of the Port of Antwerp tend to ship lower-value
cargoes and are more tolerant of hold-ups and longer transit times, as
long as this reduces costs (a “very Belgian attitude” according to one
forwarder). Clients with Rotterdam-oriented supply chains tend to ship
higher-value cargoes, and expect both low costs and high-quality ser-
vice. These clients tend to be footloose and willing to shift their cargo to
another port – either to the cost leader or to parties that they feel offer
preferred services at an acceptable premium – if they feel that a port
underperforms.
This seems indicative of a pattern along Porter's generic strategies,
but not the same for carriers and shippers alike. Concerning shippers,
THCs and service differentiation in a port can make a difference. To a
predominantly German hinterland, German-port-oriented supply chains
offer services for which shippers are willing to pay. Antwerp is a cost
leader, whereas Rotterdam attracts shippers with both cost-driven and
quality-driven preferences. This is seemingly a more footloose segment
than those focusing only on cost or those willing to pay a premium for
service regardless. Concerning carriers, the incentives work differently.
Apart from attracting shippers' cargo, ports can attract carriers by being
accessible and (cost-)efficient. Rotterdam's geographical characteristics
make it attractive to carriers, who can enter with fully loaded container
ships at any time. Accordingly, Rotterdam is usually the first port of call
for lines deploying the largest container ships and the preferred port for
import cargo (shipper's choice), transshipment, and repositioning
(liner's choices).
5.4.2. Freight market conditions and strategic behavior
The interviewees affirmed that market conditions, through their
effects on power relations between supply chain stakeholders, have
indirect effects on port and terminal performance. One carrier re-
presentative stated that
When the market was booming, carriers were worried that they
would not be able to secure terminal capacity in HLH ports, so many
invested in positions in deep-sea terminals. When there is over-
capacity in ports, carriers have more leverage in negotiations with
terminals. For carriers, excess capacity and competition between
terminals are convenient, as they allow them to push rates down. In
a sense, carriers play out competition between terminals.
Various respondents noted that carriers have their choice of multi-
user terminals in Rotterdam – as these terminals nearly all have excess
capacity – and can demand concessions regarding price, guarantees,
and service. A Port Authority representative expected this intensified
competition to be temporary:
With the Tweede Maasvlakte and developments in the liner market,
the terminal market in Rotterdam has been disrupted, and it is still
being settled who serves which clients. This has intensified com-
petition, but once the market settles back into equilibrium and
terminals are fully operational, relations and cooperation will go
back to normal.
In this context of relatively high buyer power, liner planning affects
port and terminal performance. The number of containers handled per
call has stagnated in Rotterdam – even though the vessel size increases
continue to be reflected in the figures for the other HLH ports – and the
share of empty containers is particularly high. Some respondents at-
tribute this to liner companies’ planning.
A stylized example: As Rotterdam can be entered fully loaded, this is
usually the first port of call on the major lanes. This first call is used to
discharge import cargo and reposition containers on the ship, as the
containers are usually stacked as low and as flat as possible to minimize
the container tiers-based toll at the Suez Canal, but this does not make
for the most efficient stowage plan to call on multiple ports.
Subsequently, the ship sails on with enough draft reduction to access
Antwerp and/or Hamburg. Before leaving Europe again, Rotterdam is
called on once more to collect the last export shipments and some last
repositioning. For carriers, this second call is cheap, because of con-
siderable discounts and overall relatively low call costs. However, this
routing is unfortunate for the terminals in Rotterdam: Import and ex-
port cargo is split between two separate, but overall less efficient, calls.
Also, the first call involves some repositioning on the ship, but these are
not profitable moves for a container terminal as no container is loaded
or unloaded. One terminal representative estimated that, per call, at
most one hundred repositioning moves take place, but with moves
between different bays of the ship, they entail inefficient use of
equipment.
The implications of carrier planning for port and terminal perfor-
mance extend beyond these first and last port of call issues. A forwarder
mentioned an increase in ‘cut and run’ calls in Rotterdam, where a ship
leaves a port before the loading and unloading is finished, in order to be
at another port in time (either to benefit from a high tide or to meet a
time window at the next terminal). When consequently containers have
to be rerouted, shippers pay the price. If they experience problems like
this often, they will consider routing their containers through another
port. The same forwarder noted that carrier schedules generally have
become more erratic and port calls in Rotterdam less punctual, causing
uncertainty for the port's terminals and shippers. In this case, carriers
use the most easily accessible and most efficient port to pick up the
slack in their operational planning.
6. Discussion and conclusions
The findings reveal an interesting paradox. For carriers, Rotterdam
is the cheapest and most convenient port, but these benefits are not
reflected in shippers' incentives. In fact, the price structure along the
HLH range may even leave Rotterdam ‘stuck in the middle’ – between
cost leader Antwerp and German ports that seem to naturally attract
cargo from the German hinterland – with a demanding and footloose
clientele of shippers. While carriers' relative market power is high,
Rotterdam's good geographical position may even be disadvantageous,
as carriers use the cheapest and most convenient port for relatively low-
value activities and activities that make less efficient use of terminals.
These include moving empty containers and strategies to compensate
for restrictions imposed by other ports, such as on-ship repositioning,
ad-hoc schedule changes, and double calls.
The findings from the case are obviously specific to the situation of
Rotterdam and the HLH range, but some general considerations for port
policy can be offered by considering the behavioral mechanisms high-
lighted. In particular, a twofold challenge for port policy can be iden-
tified: First, ports that are attractive to carriers are not necessarily
equally good at appealing to shippers, inviting a question relating to
how incentives to attract shippers to opt for the port can become better
aligned with incentives to attract carriers. Secondly, when a port is
relatively more attractive to carriers, a larger share of its handling ac-
tivity and throughput consists of relatively low-value activities (e.g.
repositioning, empty container transport, inefficient calls). Apparently,
translating or extending the properties of the port that attract carriers
into properties that attract shippers remains a challenge. How can a
port's physical advantages – location, infrastructure, equipment, etc. –
and competitive pricing that attract carriers also help to attract valuable
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cargo and value-adding activity to the port?
These considerations come with some caveats. Although we assume
that shippers make decisions in their capacity as cargo owner, and
carriers make decisions in their capacity as deep-sea liner operator,
there are likely cases in which these distinctions may blur. An example
would be a container shipped under carrier haulage. However, as in
Western Europe the majority of cargo is shipped under merchant
haulage, shipper decision making can be expected to be a major factor,
separate from carrier planning. Another limitation of this study is that
the mechanisms described cannot be proven with statistical sig-
nificance. Instead, we triangulate evidence from various quantitative
and qualitative sources to provide a plausible behavioral explanation
for observed phenomena. The rich information gathered from in-
dividual interviews and quantitative data on port throughput did not
produce factual contradictions, but in fact highlight complementary
aspects of the interdependency of port users' decision making, sug-
gesting that the findings could serve to deepen theoretical perspectives
on interrelations and complexities between port actors’ choice beha-
viors.
Generally, the findings present interesting theoretical questions for
future research. So far, port choice criteria have been assumed to be
roughly similar for carriers and shippers, but we have shown that their
effects on choice behavior and implications for ports can diverge sub-
stantially, with unexpected implications such as those highlighted in
this paper. Therefore, it is desirable to elucidate systematically when
and under what conditions which port characteristics and policy attract
which actors with what type of cargo and activity to the port. This
extends further to the question how container flows contribute to value
creation in ports. Some containers travel long distances to and from the
port without being opened, but, for other cargoes, consolidation and
deconsolidation activities – and perhaps even other activities such as
packaging, assembly, or production – may be concentrated in the port
cluster. The question remains how ports can attract more high-value
cargoes and activities to the port cluster.
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